Van Strien v. Jones [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
6-28-1956
Van Strien v. Jones [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Van Strien v. Jones [DISSENT]" (1956). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 141.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/141
VAN S·rniEN v. JoNES 
l·lG C.2cl 705; 299 P.2d I I 
[L. A. 1\u. 23858. In Bank. Jmw 
lOG 
NCES VAN STIUK\, Appellant, v. ARCHIE H. 
JO"NES, as Executor, etc., Hespondent. 
[1] Wills-Disinheritance-Provisions of Will.-·Where m a will 
tl'~tator's child i~ iuteutionally omitted or given $1.00 or 
[2] 
other sum, Prob. Code, § 90, relating to disinheritance, is 
,nti~fied although the child is not mentioned by name. 
-Disinheritance- Provisions of Will.-The use of such 
a;; "relatives" and "children" in a will is sufficient 
designate heirs who might otherwisP be pretermitted, but 
generalities as "anyone who may contest this will" and 
other person" do not include heirs otherwise pretermitted. 
[3] !d.-Disinheritance-Provisions of WilL-Testator's daughter 
a former marriage is not a pretermitted heir where the 
in addition to providing generally for "any person" who 
,,]nims under the will, also provides that if "any person who 
I die intestate would be eutitled to share in my estate" 
~hould contest the will he bequeaths to such pPrson the sum 
$1.00. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Bernardino County. Archie D. Mitchell, Jnc1ge. Affirmed. 
Actiou to establish a constructive trust. Judgment for 
defeudant on sustaining demurrer to complaint without leave 
to affirmed. 
Berniee l\L Coady and Joseph K. Coady for .. ::\.ppellant. 
Herbert C. Naylor for Hespondent. 
SilENK, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment for the 
defem1ant after a demurrer to the eomplaint had been sus-
tained without leave to amend. 
Robert Ludwig died testate on July 23, 1952. Sur-
him were the plaintiff, Frances Van Strien, a daugh-
a former marriage, and the widow Mary E. Ludwig 
vms appointed executrix of the will of her deceased hus-
'rhe entire estate was distributed to the widow m 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Wills, § 238; Am.Jur., Wills, § 582. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Wills,§ 317; [2, 3] Wills,§ 318. 
46 C.2d-23 
[46 0.2d 
decree of dis-
action was brought 
that the 
of the deceased and that the de-
which came into her by 
way favor. Since 
commencement of the action the defendant E. Lud-
died and Archie R. Jones was executor of her 
wilL References to defendant will be deemed to be to 
E. 
In her the alleges that the defendant's 
IJC,~Hi.Vll for admission of the will to probate falsely stated 
that the defendant was the only heir of the deceased; that 
the defendant made such statement to prevent the plaintiff 
from of or participating in the probate proceedings; 
that a similar false statement was made in the defendant's 
petition for the decree of distribution and the decree which 
followed was based thereon; that the plaintiff did not re-
ceive a notice of the probate proceedings, and that she did 
not know of her father's death until over a year after the 
decree of distribution was entered. 
The main question involved on the appeal is whether the 
plaintiff is a pretermitted heir under section 90 of the Pro-
bate Code. That section provides: "When a testator omits 
to in his will for any of his children, or for the 
issue of any deceased child, whether born before or after 
the making of the will or before or after the death of the 
testator, and such child or issue are unprovided for by any 
settlement, and have not had an equal proportion of the 
testator's property bestowed on them by way of advance-
ment, unless it appears from the will that such omission was 
such child or such issue succeeds to the same 
share in the estate of the testator as if he had died intestate." 
If the plaintiff is a pretermitted heir it appears that her 
complaint alleges sufficient facts to entitle her to relief from 
the decree of distribution. (See Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. 
v. Sandberg, 35 Cal.2d 1 [215 P.2d 721]; Gale v. Witt, 31 
Cal.2d 362 [188 P.2d 755] ; 20 Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and 
Administrators, p. 110.) 
The defendant claims that the deceased a clause con-
tained in his will disinherited the plaintiff in terms suffi-
cient to satisfy section 90. That clause provides: "If any 
person who is, or claims under or through, a devisee, legatee, 
or beneficiary under this Will, or any person who if I died 
J{urt 
be, 
lun' 
the 
the in addition to 
for ''<my person'' who claims under the 
that if "any person who if l (lied intestate 
107 
itled to share in my estate" shonld eontesl the will 
to snch person ihe sum of .00. In e,-,trde 
190 CaL 146 :no P. . the testator : "I 
nherit each and all persons ',yhatsoen~r to 
·who may br, my heirs at law .. and if allY of such 
or such or any person whomsoeyer wl10, if I 
wonld be cntN?cd to auy my estale ... 
establish or assert any daim to my estatP .. I here-
and to said person or prrsom: the :sum of 
·' The of that will which 
a1·p almost Hentical \\·ith the elam:c in 
ease. ln FJ,frrfc Dixnn, :?8 CaLApp. 
[ 8~l P.2d 98 J, the will also "contained a elanw almost 
·with the will of the decedent in" thP Knrtz ease. 
!Se,, Eslnle of Lindsa);, s~tpra, J7G CaL 2:\f\: Estate 
l!rrs' fil. supra. 1G8 CaL 287; Estrrte 16 Cal.App. 
2(1 [GO P.2d 1000].) In all of the e:c1scs it was 
hr],! that ehildren or of the tcstnlor 1n•rr not 
pr(•1 <'rmitted. IYhere the wills rrferred to them as "heirs 
not mentioned," or "persons elaiming to be heirs." 
--
70S 146 C.2d 
or as in the present case, "persons who if I died intestate 
would be entitled to any part of my estate.'' Such provisions 
in wills are guards against specific contests of the will, as 
distinguished from provisions whereby the testator bequeaths 
$1.00 or other sum to ''anyone who may contest this will.'' 
(Estate of Cochran, sttpra, 116 Cal.App.2d 98.) The wills 
in the Kurtz and other cases herein cited to like effect make 
definite and specific reference to persons who, by the laws of 
succession, would be entitled to participate in the testator's 
estate had he died intestate, or had he died testate but failed 
to mention them in his will or otherwise provide for them. 
Those cases support the conclusion of the trial court in sus-
taining the demurrer. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C .• T., Traynor, ,T., Spence, .J., and ::VIcComb, .J., 
concurred. 
CARTEH, .J .-I dissent. 
'fhe crucial clause in the will is nothing more than a ''no 
contest'' provision and does not purport to show a provision 
for or disinheritan(·e of deceased 'R daughter; it does not 
Rhow that deceased testator had her in mind. 
Before it may be said that section 90 of the Probate Code 
has been satisfied it must appear from the will that the 
testator had his child in mind, and intentionally omitted 
her as a legatee from his will. 'fhis has bren stated re-
peatedly in many cases. Tt iR said in In re Salmon, 107 Cal. 
614, 617 [40 P. 1030, 48 Am.St.Rep. 164]: "It is further 
contended, howPver, that the fad that thr t('Rtator mrntions 
the widows of his deceased sons, the mothers of the omitted 
grandchildren, is sufficient, of itself, to show, without resort 
to extrinsic facts, that the testator had his grandchildren in 
his mind, and rebuts the presumption that they were for-
gotten. This position is equally untenable w·ith the first. 
\Yhilc the anthorities of other states are far from being 
uniform or harmonious upon the subject it is well settled 
in this state that the mere fact that a testator mentions one 
elosely related by blood or intimately associated in family 
relations with the omittrd heir, does not show, as mattrr of 
constrnetion, that the omitted one was in his 1nind and that 
th mniission was intentionr1l. (Estate of Utz, 4:l Cal. 200; 1 
Rush v. Lindsey, 44 CaL 121; In rr Str:vMts, supra 183 Cal. 
:)22 (23 P. 370, 17 Am.St.Rep. 2:)2)] .) In Bush v. Lindsey, 
d 
Iii 
.s 
s 
., 
e 
f 
l 
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IO!J 
t<>stalor dcrisPd his property to iII(' ehil(l of a 
son, b:lt tlid not mention (•hildren of tlw testator 
lt was held that this di<1 not show that he had 
t·en in mind and intended to omit thelll. h1 In re 
SIIJim, the testator faih•d to mrutim1 or' pnwide for 
ter, but ldt a lrgaey to her ehild, the testator's 
; and it 'ras held that the fact that lw mentioned his 
's ehild did not nee(•ssm·ily imply that the daughter 
his miud, and she ,,·as permitted to take as a pre-
heir." (Emphasis 1H1(led.) In In rr: Stevens, 
~;J Cal. ;)22 [23 P. ;)7!1, 17 Am.St.Hcp. 252], the testator 
r.o mention or provide for his daughter but left her 
the testator's grandson, a legacy. It was held the 
,,·as pretermitted, the court stating (p. 329): "[I]t 
omission J mnst appear on the face of ihe >Yill, 
must then appear from words whieh imlieate sneh 
intent directly, or by implication equally as str011g. Any 
otlH'r rule wonl(l lead to guesses or to inf(•ren(•es merely 
which would be too unsubstantial to base a 
on. \V c do not think that we ean sa~' with any 
eertainty that the wonls usN1 in the will indicate 
1l1ai :\Irs. Hubbard \Yas in the rninil of the testator when 
he \HOi e his will, and that he intentionally omitted to mention 
her. \Ye think that the corrcet rule is, that the words of the 
will must show, as above pointed ont, that the I rstator had the 
person omittrcl in his rnin('l, and having her so in his mind, 
had omitted to make any mention of her. 
" rule here laid down is plain and simple, and we 
think in aee(mlanee with the statute, as interpreted in the 
Uarnmd ease, it is an easy matter to put the question beyoml 
a (loubt by naming the children or grandchildren in the 
·with a nominal legacy, or none at all, from which it will 
appear that these persons are in the mind of the 
and therefore the omission to leave them anything 
must have been intentional." (Emphasis added.) It is 
~aid in EstaJe of Eggleston, 129 Cal.App.2d 601, 607 [277 
P.2d 469]: "Under the statute [section 90] au heir is in-
tentionally omitted from a will if it appears from the will 
that the testator had the omitted prrson in mind, and having 
him in his mind, has omitted him from the provisions of the 
will. (Estate of Trickett, 197 Cal. 20, 23 [23!1 P. 406]; 
Estate of Talm.age, 114 Cal.App.2d 6:34,637 [247 P.2d 1:31].)" 
(Emphasis added.) In Estate of Labrie, 130 Cal.App.2d 
235, 2:17 r218 P.2c1 760], the court said: "Under the statui!~ 
intent that the; 
of the will 
17 Cal. 
Estate 203-204.) 
'' that is, leaving a small amount 
who contests the will is not enough, 
''anyone,'' is broad and in-
clusive. The court so held in Estate of 116 Cal.App. 
2d 100 P.2d 41], stating: "In the Estate of Price, 
supra, 56 Cal.App.2d the court had occasion to consider 
a clause as follows: 'I purposely refrain from leaving 
. . . to any other person or persons, and in the 
event that any other person or persons shall either directly 
or contest this my last will and testament I give 
to any such person or persons contesting said ·will the sum 
of and no more, hereby declaring that I have only at this 
date two surviving children, to wit: my said two sons above 
named., rrhere the testatrix left surviving her not only the 
two sons mentioned in her will but two grandchildren, 
children of a deceased son of the testatrix. Upon 
the hearing of a filed on behalf of the grandchildren, 
the trial court held that they were pretermitted heirs of 
the decrased and entitled to their proportionate share of the 
estate. The District Court of Appeal, in affirming the decree, 
considered all of the authorities cited above and held them 
inapplicable by reason of the fact that the language of the 
\Vill made mention only of 'persons' contesting the will and 
not to heirs. The court, after referring to the Estate of 
Lindsay, 176 Cal. 238 [168 P. 113], and observing that our 
Supreme Court therein 'discussed and distinguished' the 
case of IIargadine v. Pulte, 27 Mo. 423, proceeds as follows 
(p.338): 
"'In that case (Hargadine v. Pulte) the excluding clause 
covered all and every person or persons. Our Supreme 
Court said that from these words it was not apparent ''on 
the face of the will'' that the testator intended to distinguish 
between his living children and his grandchildren. 
t 
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the will of Mrs. Price we find which 
this rule. The are not men-
and is contained therein which would indicate 
testatrix had them in mind when the will was ex-
The other person or per-
gave to person or persons 
sum of one dollar. Now it is settled law 
which 
the 
heir his interest under this section 
is not a contestant and does not contest the 
vest absolutely upon the death of the testator 
his particular interest is there is no will. 
of 199 Cal. 391, 405 [245 P. .) ' 
at page 339 the court continues as follows: 
plain terms of the code section calling for a show-
upon the face of the will that "such omission was in-
preclude a holding that a general exclusion of all 
not mentioned is sufficient. If such a general ex-
clause were sufficient the next step would be one de-
wife my sole heir" which was held insufficim1t 
wr.ruu.mJ v. Bradley, 24 Mo. 311, and in which 
said 320) : "And in the testator's will in 
ease, it is not in the power of the court, from the will 
to say whether the testator had a child living or not, or 
he ever had one. As to the children of the testator 
is a mere " We could say the same 
we were to reverse the case, it would be necessary to 
in judicial legislation, and to declare that the sec-
the code did not require the ''intentional'' omission 
heir to appear upon the face of the will.' " Estate 
56 Cal.App.2d 335 [132 P.2d 485], is particularly in 
There the testator provided in his will that re-
from leaving anything to other ' and if 
other person" contests the will he shall receive $1.00. 
held that there was no intentional omission of 
of a deceased child. 
clause in the instant will says that if any person 
712 v AC'! STRIEX v. JOC'!ES [46 0.2d 
who would be entitled to share in deceased's estate, if he died 
intestate, shall contest the will he shall receive $1.00 only. 
It is nothing more than a contest clause and the reference 
''any person'' no more shows that he had his daughter in 
mind than the ''any person'' words in the Price and Cochran 
cases, sttpra. .A case very similar to the instant one is In re 
Ray's Estate, 69 Nev. 204 [245 P.2d 990], where the testator 
had a son born many years before he made his will in which 
he provided the same as in the instant case (p. 991 [245 
P.2d]) : "If ... any other person who, if I died whollv 
or partially intestate, would be entitled to share in my estat~, 
shall, in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly, con-
test this \Vill or attack, oppose or in any mann0r seek to 
impair or invalidate any provision hereof, or shall, in any 
manner whatsoever ... or shall endeavor to succeed to anv 
part of my estate, otherwise than through this Will, then i~ 
each of the above mentioned cases I hereby bequeath to such 
person or persons the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) only .... " 
The court held this was insufficient to disinherit a son under 
a statute the same as ours, stating (p. 992 [245 P.2d]): 
"[T]wo questions are presented for our consideration: First: 
whether the will through paragraph tenth [above quoted] has 
'provided' for Barringer. Second: if not, whether the will 
demonstrates that such omission to provide was intentional. 
If either question be answered in the affirmative, then Bar-
ringer has failed to establish himself as a pretermitted heir. 
"Upon these two questions authority is in a state of con-
fusion far from helpful. ... We cannot escape the convic-
tion that the widespread split of authority is due in some 
part to the varying degrees to which the several courts may 
feel impelled to question the wisdom of the statutory theory 
and presumption of mistake under present day conditions; 
or may regard it as an infringement upon freedom of testa-
tion to be carefully hedged about with safeguards. . . . In 
the absence of apparent testamentary intent it is not within 
the judicial province to substitute therefor our own views 
as to the proprieties and needs of each individual case and 
to modify or exclude application of the statutory presump-
tion accordingly. 
''The nature and weight of the presumption created by 
our own statute has already been carefully considered by this 
eourt in In re Parrott's Estate, 4G Nev. :ns, 330 [203 P. 
258, 261]. 'fhere it was held that failure to provide for a 
child 'raises the presumption that [the] omission from the 
l 
•I 
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f 4o C.2d 70:l; J I 
. Lat lhe 
Ill re Sle/J(i/S, s:l Cal :::w I 17 Am.Rt. 
wa::; qnotrd wit!J as follows: '\Yo think 
rule that !lw words of the will must sh<rw, 
tlw IJ':rson om it ted in his 
had omitted to make any 
in any ' ' con-
then, appear that the 
the terms of the clause 
intended to proyide for him. 'l'he language of 
however, shows upon its faee that it HJas not 
11:e p1u·poses or tlu· purpose of mak-
those of any particular class. It was in-
clud,•d for 1lw purpose• of protecting the will and the estate 
attaek. Hs 1!SP of jJw langnage, 'r hereby bequeath 
to person,' does not alter its status in this regard. Be-
persotJ nndet· lhat paragraph woHld be rntitled 
to 1 ' there provide-](], he must first (IOmply with 
thl' t:OlH1itinn preeedC'nt of attaeking the \rill or the estate. 
Snell eolHlitional and nominal 'bequest', inelucled in the will 
for ~.neh obvious purpose and \Yithont any intent 011 the part 
of lite testaior to provide for any indiviclnal or elass, can-
not, fe<>l, be eonsi<lered any 'provision' whatsoever .... 
\Vc therefore eonelude that thel'0' has been an omission to 
for Barringer ·within the meaning of § 9919, N.C.L. 
Tlw question is whethrr it appears that snch omis-
sion \Yas intentionaL 
fin;t r,ontcmls that the language of paragraph 
itself show~; an intent to omit to provide for Barringer. 
rt is statrd that Barringer is the only prrson to whom 
this eonlcl apply and thrrefore the trstator mnst 
hayc had Barringer in mind in so providing. 
" eontention we mnst rrject. Jnst as th£s paragraph 
sh IJWs lack clisposdivc ·in I en f. so 1:t shows lack of intent 
to rlisinherit a:ny partic11.lar person m· those of any class. If 
lhr; testator hacl anuthing at all in mind here, n was that 
SOiiwone---anyone at all-- might assert n'ghts against the w£ll 
or 1 be estate contra1·y to the provisions of the will; 
that the IYill and the estate t'lhould be protected against the 
a;;s,'J'tion of any sneh rights. That BarringPr falls within 
714 VAN STRIEN v. JONES C.2d 
the scope of the thus afforded we feel, 
demonstrate that the testator had him in mind 
more tlwn thai he had in min'd every other person in the 
world whose assertion of he had 
''What we seek to find in the will is not the extent of 
exclusion but rather an indication 
intent to disinherit. The so-called exclusion 
limited form may be said to 
demonstratE' such an whether it be nominal pro-
nsiOn . . or by expressed intent to disinherit. . . . In either 
case it may well be said that the used demonstrates 
that the testator had in mind the existence of members of 
the designated class. No s1wh 'having in mind' can be ass1wned 
the language of para{fraph tenth. That paragraph is 
purely a general protective device as consistent with pre-
termission as with remembrance. The scope of the protection 
afforded reflects simply the degree of care used in preparation 
of the will, the clear intent being to protect against everyone. 
A general exclusion of 'all persons not mentioned' is not 
sufficient to show that a specific omission was intentional. 
In re Price's Estate, 56 Cal.App.2d 335 [132 P.2d 485]. So 
the testator here cannot be said to have had in mind the 
existence of members of any particular class against whom 
such protection was afforded. Certainly it cannot be said that 
the expression of testamentary intent to disinherit (if such 
may be found) is strong or plain enough to meet the re-
quirements of In re Parrott's Estate, supra." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Here the deceased testator did not show in his will that he 
had his (',hild (appellant) in mind and intentionally omitted 
to provide for her. On the contrary it appears that he had 
forgotten her. As indicated in pretermission of a spouse 
(Pro b. Code, § 70) : "It being necessary for the testator 
to have 'in mind' a 'momentous' occasion such as marriage, 
it follo>vs that merely naming or giving a legacy to a person 
by name, as was done in the case at bar, with no indication 
that she may be a prospective spouse, is not enough to prevent 
revocation. That indication must appear on the face of the 
will. and extrinsic evidence is not admissible to show the 
testator's intention, at least unless there is some ambiguity. 
As in the Duke case a legacy to a named person alone, al-
though the named person is later married to the testator, 
creates no ambiguity; it is merely 'noncommittal' as were 
DERNY 7'. \V!LDER 
f46 C.2d 715; 299 P.2d 2571 
hnY' in the Duke case." 
149 P.2d 
715 
190 Cal. 14fJ P. , was oyerruled 
23 Cal.2c1 7fJl [147 P.2cl 1] Estate 
598 P.2cl wrong 
and Cochran cases, supra, 
eoncnrrcd. 
for a 
Schaner, 
grante<l. 
A. No. 33802. In Bank. ,June 28, 1956.] 
fC'l'OH DESNY, Appellant, v. BILLY WILDER 
et Respondents. 
24, 
that 
Judgments-Summary Judgments-Issues Precluding Judg-
ment.-The issue to be determined by the trial court in ruling 
motion for summary judgment is whether or not the party 
the motion has prPsented an.v fncts whieh nse 
a triahle issue or defense, and not to pass on or determine 
true facts in the case. 
Id.-Summary Judgments-Opposing Affidavits.-The fncts 
in affidavits of the party against whom a motion for 
summary judgment is made must he accepted as truC', and 
he sufficient such affidavits need not he composed 
of facts. 
[3] !d.-Summary Judgments-Affidavits.-A sum11Jary judgment 
proper only if affidavits in support of the moving- party 
vmnld he sufficient to sustain a judgmPnt in his fanll', anil his 
See Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 38 et seq. 
Dig. References: [1] Judgments, § 8a(5); Judgments, 
~Sn!O); Judgments, §8a(8); [4] Appeal and Error, §868; 
1'2-18, 25-27, 29-50, 53, 54, 57] Literary Property; 
812; [11] Property, §1; [19] Actions, §19: Con-
§ 3; [21-23] Contracts, § 4; [24] Evidence, § 327: [28] 
~ 95 [51] Agency, § 194; [52] Judgments, ~ 8a(l1); 
Pleading, § 273; [56] Pleading, § 175(1); [58] AppPal and 
§ 62. 
